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Abstract
To answer the generalized Kretschman objection, we propose a criterion to decide if the gauge symmetry
of a theory is artificial or substantial. It is based on the dressing field method of gauge symmetry reduction,
a new simple tool from mathematical physics. Given this criterion we argue that the notion of spontaneous
symmetry breaking is superfluous to the empirical success of the electroweak unification theory. Important
questions regarding the context of justification of the theory then arise.
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1 Introduction
Philosophical analysis of gauge symmetries, long overdue, gained particular interest in the past fifteen years. Several
notions deserve scrutiny. One is the gauge principle, according to which imposing a local/gauge symmetry on a
free theory turns it into an interaction theory. This was suggestively encapsulated by Yang’s aphorism “Symmetry
dictates interaction” [1], clearly one of the conceptual revolution of the last century. But soon philosophers of
physics took hold of the celebrated principle and scrutinized it. And sure enough it was found, e.g in [2] (see also
[3]), that actually gauge symmetry might not be the sole criterion constraining the space of admissible theories, and
that others like renormalizability may even be more fundamental, with gauge symmetry as an epiphenomenon.
Nevertheless, it seems undeniable that gauge symmetries are a powerful heuristic guide to zero in on fruitful
and ultimately empirically adequate theories of the fundamental interactions. So that they appear to tell something
deep and important about Nature. But it took little time to raise a problem with this conclusion, which can be
summarized by saying that there is a generalized Kretschmann objection applicable to gauge symmetries. As a
reminder, shortly after Einstein delivered his General Theory of Relativity (GR), Erich Kretschman suggested in
1917 that the principle of general covariance was empty, unable to constrain the space of admissible theories,
since any theory could be written as to be generally covariant. There has been a long and lively debate over the
validity of Kretschman’s objection and the relevance of general covariance in relativity theory, and much effort to
determine if there is a demarcation criterion to distinguish artificial general covariance from substantial general
covariance [4]. It happens that much of this discussion applies, mutatis mutandis, to gauge symmetries and that a
generalized Kretschman objection [5; 6] can be raised against the gauge principle: Physicists have devised many
ways to implement a gauge symmetry in a theory lacking it [7; 8], so if any theory can be turned into a gauge theory,
how come that gauge symmetries are regarded as a fundamental insight into the hidden structure of Nature? Can
we distinguish artificial and substantial gauge symmetries? Can one propose one or several demarcation criteria?
One of the goal of the present paper is to bring attention to a new simple mathematical tool to deal with gauge
symmetries, the dressing field method, that might provide just such a criterion. Although it has no pretention to
universality, it seems to me that it allows to capture a key insight as to what counts as a substantial gauge symmetry
in connection to non-local properties of genuine gauge theories, and thus has some relevance to this debate. In
section 2, I give a brief description of the method, which is easy to grasp in its gist, and refer to the published
literature for technical details and elaborations.
1
As a relevant application, I then undertake an analysis of the electroweak unification. It is still common wisdom
among practicing physicists to consider the notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) as pivotal to the
success of the theory. The idea is seen as a most important insight into the structure of physical reality. An opinion
so widely shared and unquestioned that no modern textbook on gauge field theory or quantum field theory omits to
devote the proper space to expose it, and that even prominent physicists and science popularizers convey it to the
layman [9; 10], sometimes going as far as to suggest that it is the most revolutionary discovery of XXth century
theoretical physics [11; 12] (over relativity and quantum theory?).
But is it so? Since at least fifteen years philosophers of physics have voiced skepticism. Here I will join my
voice to theirs: relying on the dressing field method, which gives a clear conceptual language to elucidate the real
content of the electroweak unification, I will argue that the answer is a definitive “No”: The empirical success of
the Glashow-Weinberg-Salam model is entirely independent of the interpretation in terms of SSB.
It is to be hoped that this conclusion will come to be more widely acknowledged in the physics community. Un-
fortunately, it is common among scientists to be somewhat dismissive of the inquiries of philosophers.1 An attitude
for which little price is usually paid, in the short term. But in this case, not acknowledging the insight of philoso-
phers of physics would certainly lead to an astoundingly long-lived misconception at the heart of particle physics
to remain uncorrected for still some times, and important ensuing questions regarding the context of justification of
the electroweak model to remain unasked, let alone answered.
2 The dressing field method of gauge symmetry reduction
The dressing field method has been devised as a mean to handle, i.e reduce, gauge symmetry in a way that differs
markedly from either gauge fixing or SSB mechanisms, and bears some resemblance to the bundle reduction theo-
rem from the differential geometry of fiber bundles [16]. It has been applied mainly to conformal geometry where
it allows to recover tractor and twistor calculi (analogues for conformal manifolds of the Ricci and spinorial calculi
on Riemanian manifolds) from a gauge reduction of the Cartan conformal geometry [17; 18]. It also uncovered a
new class of gauge fields, called non-standard or twisted gauge fields, which generalize vector bundles sections and
connections used in Yang-Mills theories to model matter fields and gauge potentials. See [19; 20] for a review with
technical details and references. The method is fully developed within the geometry of fiber bundle, but its basics
and application to physical models are easy to state.
2.1 The basic mathematical setup of the method
First we need to lay the setup for a gauge theory. Consider a gauge theory on a m-dimensional spacetime manifold
(M, g), whose gauge group of symmetry is H := {γ : M → H} with H a Lie group with Lie algebra h, and which
by definition acts on itself via γγ21 = γ
−1
2 γ1γ2.
2 Its basic space of fields is Φ = {A, F, ϕ}, where F is the field strength
(curvature 2-form ∈ Ω2(M, h)) of the gauge potential (connection 1-form ∈ Ω1(M, h)) A and ϕ is a matter field
pertaining to a representation (ρ,V) of H. The gauge group acts on the space of fields, Φ
H−→ Φγ, as
Aγ = γ−1Aγ + γ−1dγ, Fγ = γ−1Fγ,
ϕγ = ρ(γ−1)ϕ and Dϕγ = ρ(γ−1)Dϕ, (1)
where D := d + ρ∗(A) is the covariant derivative implementing the minimal coupling between the matter field and
the gauge potential.
Now, a physical theory is specified by its Lagrangian m-form L(A, ϕ). In the case of a gauge theory, the La-
grangian is required to be H-gauge invariant: L(Aγ, ϕγ) = L(A, ϕ). A prototypical and almost minimal Yang-Mills
1One recalls the notorious example of Hawking and Mlodinow [13] and the controversial interview by Lawrence Krauss in The Atlantic
[14] where he opinioned that “[...] the worst part of philosophy is the philosophy of science; the only people, as far as I can tell, that
read work by philosophers of science are other philosophers of science. It has no impact on physics what so ever, and I doubt that other
philosophers read it because it’s fairly technical. And so it’s really hard to understand what justifies it.” He later gave a retraction in a column
of Scientific American [15].
2Here H is to be seen as the pulled-back version of the group of vertical automorphisms of the underlying principal bundle P(M,H)
overM, and not as the group of transition functions between different trivializations of P. So we deal with active rather than passive gauge
transformations, which makes no formal difference.
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Lagrangian is
L(A, ϕ, ϕ′) = LYM + LScalar + LDirac,
= 12 Tr(F ∧ ∗F) + 〈Dϕ, ∗Dϕ〉 − m2〈ϕ, ϕ〉 + 〈ϕ′, γ ∧ ∗Dϕ′〉 − m′〈ϕ′, ϕ′〉, (2)
where ϕ is a scalar field with mass m and ϕ′ is a spinor field with mass m′. Here ∧ is the wedge product of
differential forms, ∗ : Ωp(M)→ Ωm−p(M) is the Hodge star operator, while Tr and 〈 , 〉 are bilinear forms on h and
V respectively. As for γ = γµdxµ, it is a one form whose components are Dirac’s gamma matrices. A mass term
for the gauge potential A, µ2Tr(A ∧ ∗A), failing to be gauge-invariant by virtue of (1), is forbidden so that a gauge
interaction is a priori long range.
The core idea of the dressing field method consists in the following simple observation. Suppose the structure
group H has some normal subgroup J, so that the gauge group H correspondingly has a normal subgroup J .
Suppose further that in the above setup of a gauge theory, one can extract a local field u : M → J, defined by its
transformation property under γ ∈ J : uγ = γ−1u. Such a field we call a dressing field. With it we can perform a
change of field variable, Φ→ Φu, by forming the following composite fields :
Au : = u−1Au + u−1du, Fu = u−1Fu,
ϕu : = ρ(u−1)ϕ and Duϕu = ρ(u−1)Dϕ, (3)
where Du := d + ρ∗(Au). These fields are J-invariants variables. Notice that despite a formal similarity with (1),
(3) are not gauge transformations. Indeed, by virtue of its defining transformation property, the dressing field is not
an element of the gauge group: u < H .
Taking advantage of the H-gauge invariance of the Lagrangian, which holds as a strictly formal property, and
of the formal similarity between (1) and (3), we can rewrite the gauge theory in terms of the J-invariant variables:
L(A, ϕ, ϕ′) = L(Au, ϕu, ϕ′u),
= 12 Tr(F
u ∧ ∗Fu) + 〈Duϕu, ∗Duϕu〉 − m2〈ϕu, ∗ϕu〉 + 〈ϕ′u, γ ∧ ∗Duϕ′u〉 − m′〈ϕ′u, ∗ϕ′u〉. (4)
This theory is therefore not a H gauge theory, as the prima facie form (2) of the theory would have us think,
but a H/J-gauge theory.3 Clearly the transformation of the composite fields (3) under the residual H/J-gauge
symmetry depends on the behavior of the dressing field under this same symmetry. Some particularly important
cases are described in [18].
Insofar as the genuine physical degrees of freedom of a gauge theory are given by gauge invariant quantities,
the dressing field method helps to easily exhibit the physical content of a gauge theory.
2.2 Artificial vs substantial gauge symmetry
Due to the many good properties of gauge theories (in relation e.g with renormalization), over time physicists have
devised various ways to implement a gauge symmetry in a theory lacking it [5]. The Stueckelberg trick is the
forefather of these and its generalization seems to be of some relevance still to contemporary studies [7]. It is easily
illustrated on the historic example of the Proca model (1936) for massive electromagnetism. Proca’s Lagrangian is
L(A) = 12 F ∧ ∗F + µ2A ∧ ∗A (5)
and describes a massive vector field, so that the theory has no U(1) gauge symmetry. Now Stueckelberg (1938)
proposed to implement such a gauge symmetry by adding a compensating field, the Stueckelberg field B, satisfying
Bγ = B − µθ while the vector field becomes a gauge field transforming as Aγ = A − dθ, with γ = eiθ ∈ U(1). A
minimal Stueckelberg Lagrangian is then,
L(A, B) = 12 F ∧ ∗F + µ2(A − 1µdB) ∧ ∗(A − 1µdB) (6)
3The requirement of normality for J, while not strictly necessary, insures that H/J is still a group.
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and is aU(1)-gauge theory.
In spite of what would be infered from a superficial reading, the Lagrangian (5) and (6) actually describe the
same theory. Indeed the U(1) gauge symmetry is artificial, its presence by design compensated by the degree of
freedom of the field B. In the case at hand, the Stueckelberg field is actually an abelian dressing field: u := ei/mB
so that uγ = ei/µ(B−µθ) = γ−1u. The associatedU(1)-invariant composite field is then Au := A + iu−1du = A − 1µdB,
whose field strength is Fu = F. So the Stueckelberg Lagrangian (6) is rewritten in terms of gauge invariant variables
as:
L(A, B) = L(Au) = 12 F
u ∧ ∗Fu + µ2Au ∧ ∗Au, (7)
which is nothing but the Proca Lagrangian, devoid of any gauge symmetry. One may think of the dressing field
method as a reciprocal to the Stueckelberg trick: the latter aims at implementing an artificial gauge freedom, the
former seeks to erase it to reveal the gauge-invariant content.
The above simple discussion is illustrative of an important point: if one can find in a gauge theory a local
dressing field, meaning that its value at a spacetime point depends only on this point and no others, then the
invariant composite fields in terms of which the theory can be rewritten are local variables. So one pays no price in
erasing the gauge symmetry, which is then fully dispensable. I therefore propose the following criterion:
A local dressing field in a gauge theory signals that its gauge symmetry is artificial. (C1)
Gauge theories present a number of conceptual as well as technical challenges. Among those, the fact that
the gauge variables have a nondeterministic evolution, and the hindrance gauge symmetry poses a priori to the
quantification of the theory. Dirac has pondered long and hard about these difficulties in the context of electromag-
netism, an abelian U(1)-gauge theory. One solution he first proposed in a 1955 paper [21] and then developed in
the 1958 fourth edition of his Principles of Quantum Mechanics [22] (section 80), was to reformulate the theory
with gauge-invariant variables, which would qualify as physical variables.
In the following we use essentially the notations of Dirac’s 1955 paper [21] while setting all fundamental
constants to 1. Let ψ be the electron field and A = (A0, Ar) the electromagnetic gauge potential, subject to the
U(1)-gauge transformations ψ′ = eiSψ and A′ = A + dS . Dirac introduces the new variables ψ∗ = eiCψ (Eq [16])
and the associated “covariant” derivative dψ∗ − iA∗ψ∗ = eiC(dψ − iAψ), with A∗ = A + dC (Eq [21] and below).
The phase factor is defined by C(x) =
∫
cr(x, x′)Ar(x′)d3x′, and in order for the new variables to be gauge invariant
cr(x, x′) must satisfy ∂∂x′r cr(x, x
′) = δ(x−x′) (Eq [18]). Dirac then notices that the latter equation admits the Coulomb
potential as a solution,4 so that by proceeding with the quantification of the electromagnetic theory written in terms
of his invariant variables he interprets ψ∗ in the following way:
“We can now see that the operator ψ∗(x) is the operator of creation of an electron together with its
Coulomb field, or possibly the operator of absorption of a positron together with its Coulomb field. It
is to be contrasted with the operator ψ(x), which gives the creation or absorption of a bare particle.
A theory that works entirely with gauge-invariant operators has its electrons and positrons always
accompanied by Coulomb fields around them, which is very reasonable from the physical point of
view.”
An appealing conclusion indeed. It is not hard to see that Dirac’s scheme is an instance of the dressing field
method. Indeed under gauge transformation of the gauge potential, the phase factor transforms as
C′(x) =
∫
cr(x, x′)A
′r(x′)d3x′ = C(x) +
∫
cr(x, x′) ∂S∂x′r (x
′)d3x′,
= C(x) −
∫
∂
dx′r cr(x, x
′)S (x′)d3x′ = C(x) − S (x).
So u = eiC transforms under γ = eiS ∈ U(1) as u′ = γ−1u, and is therefore an abelian dressing field, which means
that ψ∗ and A∗ in Dirac’s equation [16] and [21] are abelian instances of the composite fields ϕu and Au in (3) above.
4Other solutions differing only by terms dependent on the gauge-invariant Maxwell-Faraday field strength F.
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Should we then conclude, on the basis of the criterion (C1), that Dirac has revealed the U(1) gauge symmetry
of electromagnetism to be artificial? We must resist that conclusion because here, contrary to what happened in
the Stueckelberg model, gauge-invariance wasn’t free; it could be achieved only at the price of locality. Indeed the
dressing field u = eiC is clearly non-local, so that the gauge-invariant composite fields ψ∗ = ψu and A∗ = Au in
terms of which electromagnetism theory is rewritten are also non-local variables. It appears then that in classical
or quantum electrodynamics, there is a trade-off between gauge symmetry and locality: either one works with local
gauge variables, or with non-local gauge-invariant ones.
Such a trade-off is already familiar from the analysis of the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect [23; 24]. We recall
that one setup of the effect is a modified double slit experiment involving electrons where a solenoid stands behind
the first screen between the two slits. When a current traverses the solenoid, the interference pattern formed by the
electrons on the second screen is shifted due to a phase factor depending only on the flux of magnetic field inside
the solenoid: ei
∫
c A = ei
∫
s F (c being a closed path from the source of electron beam through the two slits to a point
on the final screen and enclosing the surface s including the solenoid). Yet, outside the solenoid - the only region
accessible to the electrons - the electromagnetic field strength vanishes, F = 0, only the electromagnetic potential
A is non-zero. So the latter is the only local variable that is available to maintain a semblance of explanation of the
alteration of the behavior of the electrons via a local interaction between fields, A and ψ.
Of course the gauge non-invariance of A makes it a doubtful candidate as a genuine physical field, as many
among physicists and philosophers alike have pointed out. Curiously it is not often stressed that it is also true for
the spinor field ψ, either seen as a wave function for electrons or as the electron quantum field. Both field variables
A and ψ should then be equally faulted for the difficulty in interpreting the AB effect in terms of local interactions
of physical field. Therefore several authors didn’t shy away from concluding that the AB effect forces us, not
to accept the physicality of the gauge potential A (which was usually seen as a computational device in classical
electromagnetism) as Aharonov and Bohm argued, but rather that there is such things as non-local electromagnetic
properties represented by gauge invariant non-local variables.5
This conclusion extends to non-abelian Yang-Mills theories. A beautiful articulation is provided by Healey [25]
who argues that the physical content of gauge theories is best represented by the path-ordered trace holonomies of
the connection, also known as Wilson loops, which are gauge-invariant non-local variables. The trade-off gauge
symmetry vs locality is indeed a characteristic features of genuine gauge theories, so that one may argue that
what is probed, indirectly, by a substantial gauge symmetry is the existence of non-local physical phenomena. In
complement to (C1), I therefore propose the following criterion:
A non-local dressing field in a gauge theory signals that its gauge symmetry is substantial. (C2)
In Dirac’s scheme, the dressing field exhibited is non-local and so are the gauge-invariant variables (the compos-
ite fields). In this case the initialU(1)-gauge symmetry is substantial as it implies that there is non-local phenomena
manifested in electromagnetic theory.
Adopting the viewpoint synthesized by the criteria (C1) and (C2), I now turn to an analysis of the Glashow-
Weinberg-Salam electroweak theory.
3 The Electroweak Theory without Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking
The opinion that the notion of SSB is pivotal to the success of the electroweak unification is pervasive among physi-
cists and rarely, if ever, questioned. But in the past fifteen years philosopher started to see the notion as suspicious.
I here argue that their intuition was correct: the SSB interpretation of the electroweak theory is superfluous to its
empirical success. Hints at this conclusion were scattered in the gauge field theory literature for years, from the
mid-sixties onward, as we will show in the commentary section 3.2. But first, in the following section we prove the
main point in sketching the treatment of the theory via the dressing field method. Further details and comments can
be found in [19; 20].
5As Aharonov and Bohm also argued. To wit, in [24] p.1513 second paragraph:
“The observable physical effects in question must therefore be attributed to the potential integrals themselves. Such inte-
grals, being not only gauge invariant, but also Hermitian operators, are perfectly legitimate examples of quantum-mechanical
observables. They represent extended (non-local) properties of the fields [...].”
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3.1 The electroweak model treated via dressing
The gauge group postulated a priori for the model isH = U(1)×SU(2) = {α×β :M→ U(1)×S U(2)}. The space
of field is Φ = {A, F, ϕ}, where A = a+b is the gauge potential 1-form with curvature F = fa+gb, and ϕ is a C2-scalar
field. The latter couples minimally with the gauge potential via the covariant derivative Dϕ = dϕ + (g′a + gb)ϕ,
with g′, g the coupling constants of U(1) and S U(2) respectively. The gauge group acts as:
aα = a + 1g′α
−1dα,
aβ = a,
bα = b,
bβ = β−1bβ + 1gβdβ,
and ϕα = α−1ϕ,
and ϕβ = β−1ϕ.
TheH-invariant Lagrangian form of the theory is,
L(a, b, ϕ) = 12 Tr(F ∧ ∗F) + 〈Dϕ, ∗Dϕ〉 − U(ϕ) vol,
= 12 Tr( fa ∧ ∗ fa) + 12 Tr(gb ∧ ∗gb) + 〈Dϕ, ∗Dϕ〉 −
(
µ2〈ϕ, ϕ〉 + λ〈ϕ, ϕ〉2
)
vol, (8)
where µ, λ ∈ R and vol is the volume form on spacetimeM. As it stands nor a nor b can be massive, and indeed L
contains no mass term for them. While at least one massless field is expected in order to carry the electromagnetic
interaction, the weak interaction is short range so its associated field must be massive. Hence the necessity to reduce
the SU(2) gauge symmetry in order to allow a mass term for the weak field.
As the usual narrative goes, this is achieved via SSB: if µ2 < 0, the electroweak vacuum given by U(ϕ) = 0
seems degenerate as it appears to be an SU(2)-orbit of non-vanishing vacuum expectation values for ϕ. When
the latter settles randomly - spontaneously - on one of them, this breaks SU(2) and generates mass terms for the
weak fields with which it couples. Oddly, in order to exhibit the physical modes of the theory it is claimed that a
convenient choice of gauge is necessary, the so-called unitary gauge (see e.g [26]). But how come we are allowed
to use a gauge freedom if it is supposedly broken?
We suggest that a better approach and a more satisfactory interpretation is provided by the dressing field method.
Indeed it is not hard to find a dressing field in the electroweak model. Considering the polar decomposition in C2
of the scalar field
ϕ = uη, with u ∈ S U(2) and η :=
(
0
||ϕ||
)
∈ R+ ⊂ C2, one has ϕβ ⇒ uβ = β−1u (9)
Thus, u is a SU(2)-dressing field that can be used to construct the SU(2)-invariant composite fields:
Au = u−1Au + 1g u
−1du = a + (u−1bu + 1g u
−1du) = a + B,
Fu = u−1Fu = fa + u−1gbu = fa + G, with G = dB + gB2,
ϕu = u−1ϕ = η, and Duη = u−1Dϕ = dη + (g′a + gB)η. (10)
Since u is local, so are the composite fields above. Therefore, by virtue of criterion (C1) we conclude that the
SU(2)-gauge symmetry of the model is artificial, so that the theory defined by the electroweak Lagrangian (8) is
actually aU(1)-gauge theory, described in terms of local SU(2)-invariant variables:
L(a, B, η) = 12 Tr(F
u ∧ ∗Fu) + 〈Duη, ∗Duη〉 −
(
µ2η2 + λη4
)
vol . (11)
We already reached our main conclusion: Since the SU(2)-gauge symmetry is artificial the interpretation of the
model in terms of SSB is superfluous, and indeed impossible when expressed in the form (11). We could then stop
here. But at this point it is not clear that as it stands our analysis reproduces all the phenomenology usually obtained
via the standard interpretation. In what follows we show that it is indeed so: It is done simply by proceeding to the
natural step of analyzing the residual and substantialU(1)-gauge symmetry of the model, which is very easily done
from the viewpoint of the dressing field method.
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ResidualU(1)-symmetry By its very definition ηβ = ηα = η, so it is already a fullyH-gauge invariant scalar field
which then qualifies as an observable. As a rule, the U(1)-residual gauge transformation of the SU(2)-invariant
composite fields depends on theU(1)-gauge transformation of the dressing field u. One finds that
ϕα ⇒ uα = uα˜, where α˜ =
(
α 0
0 α−1
)
.
Therefore Bα = (bα)u
α
= buα˜ = α˜−1u−1buα˜+ 1g α˜
−1(u−1du)α˜+ 1g α˜
−1dα˜ = α˜−1Bα˜+ 1g α˜
−1dα˜.Given the decomposition
B = Baσa, where σa are the hermitian Pauli matrices and Ba ∈ iR, we have explicitely
B = Baσa =
(
B3 B1 − iB2
B1 + iB2 −B3
)
=:
(
B3 W−
W+ −B3
)
, and Bα =
B3 + 1gα−1dα α−2W−α2W+ −B3 − 1gα−1dα
 .
The fields W± transform tensorially, it is then possible for these two fields to be massive. B3 transforms as aU(1)-
gauge potential, but with a different coupling constant, making it another massless field together with the initial
U(1)-gauge potential a. But consider theU(1) transformation of the SU(2)-invariant covariant derivative:
Duη = dη + (g′a + gB)η =
(
gW−η
dη − gB3η + g′aη
)
, and (Duη)α =
(
gα−2W−η
dη − gB3η + g′aη
)
.
We see that a U(1)-invariant combination of a and B3 appears. So, considering (a, B3) as a doublet in C2, one is
invited to perform the natural change of variables(
A
Z0
)
=
(
cos θW sin θW
− sin θW cos θW
) (
a
B3
)
=
(
cos θWa + sin θW B3
cos θW B3 − sin θWa
)
,
where cos θW = g/
√
g2 + g′2 and sin θW = g
′/
√
g2 + g′2 (θW being known as the Weinberg, or weak mixing, angle). By
construction the 1-form Z0 is fully H-gauge invariant, thus observable and potentially massive. Now, still by
construction, Aβ = A and Aα = A + 1eα
−1dα with coupling constant e = gg′/√g2 + g′2. So A transforms as aU(1)-gauge
potential, it can thus be interpreted as the massless mediator of the electromagnetic interaction whose coupling
constant e is the elementary electric charge.
The electroweak theory (11) is then expressed in terms of the gauge invariant fields η,Z0 and of theU(1)-gauge
fields W±, A:
L(A,W±,Z0, η) = 12 Tr(F
u ∧ ∗Fu) + dη ∧ ∗dη − g2η2 W+ ∧ ∗W− − (g2 + g′2)η2 Z0 ∧ ∗Z0 −
(
µ2η2 + λη4
)
vol .
(12)
The next natural step is to expand the R+-valued scalar field η around its unique groundstate η0,6 given by
U(η0) = 0, as η = η0 + H where H is the gauge-invariant Higgs field. Mass terms for Z0,W± and H depending on
η0 appear from the couplings of the electroweak fields with η and from the latter’s self interaction.7 The theory has
two qualitatively distinct phases. In the phase where µ2 > 0, η0 vanishes and so do all masses. But in the phase
where µ2 < 0, the groundstate is non-vanishing: η0 =
√
− µ2/2λ. The masses of the fields Z0,W± and H are then
mZ0 = η0
√
(g2 + g′2), mW± = η0g and mH = η0
√
2λ. All physical predictions of the electroweak theory are indeed
preserved in our treatment: masses are gained through a phase transition of the unique electroweak vacuum.
As a satisfactory concluding aside, notice the fact that this approach to the electroweak model allowing to
dispense with the idea of spontaneous breaking of a gauge symmetry offers a neat reconciliation with the so-called
Elitzur theorem [28], stating that in lattice gauge theory a gauge symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken.
6According to Westenholz [27] the very meaning of the terminology “spontaneous symmetry breaking” lies in the fact that the manifold
of vacua is not reduced to a point.
7Since A does not couple to η directly it is masslessness. The two photons decay channel of the Higgs boson involves intermediary
leptons, not treated here but whose inclusion in our scheme is straightforward.
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3.2 There is no SSB in the electroweak model and we long suspected it
It turns out that several authors were close to formulating such a gauge-invariant account of the electroweak theory.
Even before the theory was proposed, in 1965 - barely a year after his celebrated paper - Higgs hinted at a gauge
invariant formulation of the mechanism that ended-up bearing his name by working on a abelian toy model, see
section IV in [29]. In 1966, two years after his own celebrated contribution with Guralnik and Hagen, Kibble
suggested a similar analysis but working on both abelian and non-abelian models [30]. Just before the conclusion
of his paper he writes,
“We note certain characteristic features of our model. It is perfectly possible to describe it without ever
introducing the notion of symmetry breaking, merely by writing down the Lagrangian (66) [i.e, the
one written with gauge-invariant variables]. Indeed if the physical world were really described by this
model, it is (66) rather than (64) [i.e, the Lagrangian written in terms of gauge variables] to which we
should be led by experiment.”
With insight it is clear that both Higgs and Kibble were using instances of the dressing field method: see
equation (22) and below (dressing and composite fields) in [29] as well as equations (9)-(59) (dressing fields) and
(16)-(61) (composite fields) in [30].
But then the Glashow-Weinberg-Salam model was proposed the next year, using the BEHGHK8 mechanism
with its original interpretation in terms of SSB. So these important insights from Higgs and Kibble were eclipsed,
and the view of the SSB a real physical phenomenon which had happened in the early universe gained currency.
Even notorious names in physics keep perpetuating this narrative. In a panel discussion during a large conference
on the foundation of quantum field theory gathering physicists as well as historians and philosophers of physics in
Boston in 1996, the following exchange took place [31].
Nick Huggett: [...] And second, what is the mechanism, the dynamics for spontaneous symmetry
breaking supposed to be? Are there answers to these questions?
[...]
Huggett: My worry is there’s supposed to be a transition from an unbroken symmetry to the [current]
state.
Sidney Coleman: With what with temperature? A transition with what, with changing the fundamental
parameters of the theory or with -
Huggett: Right. I mean, isn’t this a dynamic evolution, something that happens in the history of the
universe?
Coleman: Oh, it happens with temperature, yeah. Typically at high temperature you’re very far from
the ground sate but the density matrix or whatever has the symmetry. Have I got it right, Steve? You
were one of the first to work this out.
Steven Weinberg: Yeah, it doesn’t always happen, but it usually happens.
Coleman: Yes, typically at high temperature the density matrix has a symmetry which then disappears
as the temperature gets lower. But its also true for ordinary material objects. [...] The difference
between the vacuum and every other quantum mechanical system is that it’s bigger. And that’s from
this viewpoint the only difference. If you understand what happens to a ferromagnet when you heat it
up above the Curie temperature, you’re a long way towards understanding one of the possible ways it
can happen to the vacuum state.
Yet, the treatment of the electroweak model through the bundle reduction theorem - see e.g [27; 32; 33] - already
cast some doubts on the interpretation of the SSB as a dynamical phenomenon. Indeed, thus formulated it appears
that the model can naturally be rewritten on a U(1)-subbundle of the initial U(1) × S U(2)-bundle.
As far as I know the first to give a fully SU(2)-gauge-invariant formulation of the electroweak theory were
Fro¨hlich, Morchio and Strocchi in 1981 [34]. Their account it actually fully equivalent to ours, but much less syn-
thetic and systematic: they are working on individual scalar component of all the fields involved! See their equations
8Brout-Englert-Higgs-Guralnik-Hagen-Kibble, to honor all contributors.
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(6.1) describing the composites fields (including dressed electron and neutrino). Subsequently, and especially in
the last 10 years, several researchers independently rediscovered the gauge invariant description formulated essen-
tially as in the above treatment, but without the conceptual clarity given by the dressing field method, as often the
dressing field was mistaken for an element of the gauge group [35] (see in particular equations (6)-(7) and comment
in between) or the interpretive shift was not fully embraced [36; 37]. Interestingly, the textbook by Rubakov gives
essentially the dressing treatment of the abelian Higgs model, but sticks to the usual treatment of the electroweak
model using the unitary gauge, see [38] chapter 6. Some improvement in conceptual clarity is found in [39]. But it is
Masson and Wallet [40] who first really appreciated the interpretive shift that comes with the invariant formulation,
and as a matter of fact their paper was a precursor to the development of the dressing field method. Unfortunately
it never get published.
In parallel, in the last few years, philosophers of science have questioned the orthodoxy of the SSB in the
electroweak model, noticing the invariant formulation [41–45]. Earman first raised the issue in striking terms:
“But what exactly is accomplished [in the BEHGHK mechanism] is hidden behind the veil of gauge
redundancy. The popular presentations use the slogan that the vector field has acquired its mass by
‘eating’ the Higgs field. [...] The popular slogan can be counterbalanced by the cautionary slogan that
neither mass nor any other genuine attribute can be gained by eating descriptive fluff. None of this
need be any concern for practicing physicists who know when they have been presented with a fruitful
idea and are concerned with putting the idea to work. But it is a dereliction of duty for philosophers to
repeat the physicists’ slogans rather than asking what is the content of the reality that lies behind the
veil of gauge.”
Earman 2004, [46] pp189-190.
Shortly latter, he reiterated:
“Readers of Scientific American can be satisfied with these just-so stories. But philosophers of science
should not be. For a genuine property like mass cannot be gained by eating descriptive fluff, which is
just what gauge is. Philosophers of science should be asking the Nozick question: What is the objective
(i.e., gauge invariant) structure of the world corresponding to the gauge theory presented in the Higgs
mechanism?”
Earman 2004, [47] pp1239.
Emphasizing Dirac’s constrained Hamiltonian formalism as a systematic way to extract the gauge-invariant quanti-
ties of a gauge system he asks:
“What is the upshot of applying this reduction procedure to the Higgs model and then quantizing the
resulting unconstrained Hamiltonian system? In particular, what is the fate of spontaneous symmetry
breaking? To my knowledge the application has not been carried out. [...]
While there are too many what-ifs in this exercise to allow any firm conclusions to be drawn, it does
suffice to plant the suspicion that when the veil of gauge is lifted, what is revealed is that the Higgs
mechanism has worked its magic of suppressing zero mass modes and giving particles their masses
by quashing spontaneous symmetry breaking. However, confirming the suspicion or putting it to rest
require detailed calculations, not philosophizing.”
Earman 2004, [46] pp190-191.
Here Earman’s preferred formalism wasn’t used, but we have seen that the dressing field method allows to easily
lift the “veil of gauge” and that in so doing Earman’s suspicion was fully vindicated. I hope that this resolution will
give philosophers of physics satisfaction.
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4 Closing statement, open questions
The dressing field method puts forward a reasonable criterion to decide if the gauge symmetry of a theory is artificial
or substantial. If a gauge theory contains a local dressing field, it can be rewritten in terms of local gauge-invariant
composite fields. Nothing is then lost in erasing the gauge symmetry, so one can argue that it was artificial, stemming
from an uneconomic - a “non-Ockhamized” - choice of variables. If on the contrary a gauge theory contains only
a non-local dressing field, then its gauge symmetry can be erased only at the price of a rewriting in terms of non-
local gauge-invariant variables. The trade-off between gauge symmetry and locality is characteristic of a substantial
gauge symmetry, which signals the existence of non-local physical phenomena (as now classical analysis of the AB
effect exemplify).
Armed with this criterion one shows that the SU(2)-gauge symmetry in the electroweak model is artificial,
canceling the need for the notion of gauge SSB, and that only the residual U(1)-gauge symmetry is substantial.
Provocatively, one could say that the substantial gauge group of the Standard Model of particle physics is therefore
notU(1) × SU(2) × SU(3), but merelyU(1) × SU(3)!
It is the job of both mathematical physicists and philosopher of physics to prune a theory from any superfluous
notion that pertains to the context of discovery so has to reveal its core conceptual and technical structure, and to
clear the horizon of its context of justification. Here we conclude that the notion of gauge SSB pertains to the
context of discovery of the electroweak unification: it has historical interest and has been a valuable heuristic guide
to the correct theory. But it cannot belong to the context of justification.
A puzzling facts remains: How are we to understand that the artificial SU(2) formulation of the model - such
as suggested by the gauge principle - is much more structurally simple than the substantialU(1) - and phenomeno-
logically clearer - formulation? Let us continue the quotation of Kibble from [30]:
“Indeed if the physical world were really described by this model, it is (66) [the Lagrangian written
with gauge-invariant variables] rather than (64) [the Lagrangian exhibiting gauge symmetry] to which
we should be led by experiment. The only advantage of (64) is that it is easier to understand the
appearance of an exact symmetry than of an approximate one. Experimentally, we would discover
the existence of a set of four vector bosons with different masses but whose interactions exhibited a
remarkable degree of symmetry. We would also discover a pair of scalar particles forming an apparently
incomplete multiplet under the group describing this symmetry. In such circumstances it would surely
be regarded as a considerable advance if we could recast the theory into a form described by the
symmetric Lagrangian (64).”
But given that the gauge symmetry is in this circumstance artificial, it must me clarified in what respect it is an
advance. And if SU(2) is artificial and as such should not tell us anything important, it is a remarkable feat that
the model guessed from it eventually had such predictive power.9 Are we to believe that the distinction artificial vs
substantial gauge symmetry does not capture all important theoretical differences and must be reconsidered?
I find this unlikely. My guess is that it remains to determine what constitutes the proper context of justification
for the electroweak theory. The gauge principle associated with the substantial U(1)-symmetry is clearly insuffi-
cient. And if a phenomenological a posteriori reconstruction is possible, it does not illuminates the key ideas or
principles that might explain the form of the theory. Actually the question stands: is there such principles that
would make the theory something other than a raw fact? Renormalizability of the quantum theory may come to
mind as a powerful constraining factor, but is it to be elevated to such a high position in the explicative hierarchy?
Effective field theory physicists would disagree. It is admitted that the Standard Model should be a low energy limit
of a more fundamental theory. The governing principle we search for may then be part of the new framework in
terms of which the latter is expressed. Could it be a new geometric framework, such a non-commutative geometry
or transitive Lie algebroids? Could it be a firmer mathematical foundation for quantum field theory, such as the
algebraic formulation or category theory? Reversing the logic, it may be that pondering on what explains the form
9The model was proposed in 1967 and predicted the neutral weak current, a given relation between the masses of the W± and the Z0 as
well as the existence of a scalar boson. The neutral weak current was discovered in 1973 in the Gargamelle experiment at CERN. The W±
bosons were discovered in January 1983 and the Z0 boson in May 1983, also at CERN. Finally the discovery of the scalar boson at the LHC
was announced in July 2012.
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of the electroweak unification could provide hints on this as yet unidentified framework and on what lies beyond
the Standard Model.
These questions can be genuinely explored only if the orthodoxy of SSB, a context of justification turned into
a common wisdom, is challenged. Philosopher of physics have spearheaded that challenge in the past fifteen years.
It is to be hoped that the community of physicists catches up quickly.
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